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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYDIA G. IVIE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
DENNIS WARING 
RICHARDSON, 
Defendant a,nd Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 8856 
We cannot agree that the facts are as set forth in 
appellant's brief. The plaintiff-respondent, carrying a 
bag of groceries and in the company of her niece, a child, 
walked north on 3rd East Street and down the edge of 
the driveway to a point which plaintiff indicated on Ex-
hibit 1 and which is marked with an "X" in ink. (See 
R. 10 and Ex. 1) An examination of Exhibits 1, 3, and 4, 
will clearly show that at the edge of the driveway is a 
curbing and the plaintiff was standing upon the curbing 
at the edge of the driveway. The fact that plaintiff on 
cross-examination termed this curb area part of the drive-
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way does not alter the fact that it is not such as a mat-
ter of fact. (See R. 30, 32) The witness clarified her pre-
vious answer on cross-examination by specifically show-
ing that the area she was in was not on the driveway: 
''REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
''By MR. HYDE: 
Q. Counsel makes somewhat a play on words, 
Mrs. Ivie, about what is driveway and what 
isn't driveway. There is an area south of here 
and north of here that the vehicles do not 
drive upon, isn't that true~ 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And were you down beyond the area where 
the vehicles ordinarily drive~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is all. 
''RECROSS Ex.<\_~IIX ATION 
"By MR. BERTOCH: 
Q. You say vehicles don't driYe on this area, :Jirs. 
Ivie1 
1\. Not normally in that area. 
Q. Well this Yehicle drove on it~ 
A. Yes. 
''REDIRECT EXA::\IIN"" ATION 
'~By JlH. I-I YDE: 
Q. This YPhicle \\Tnsn 't driving normally was it, 
l\1rs. I Yie 't 
.A .. No. 
'' 1\Iu. BERTOCH: No further questions. 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"MR. HYDE: No further questions." (R. 35, 
lines 1-23) 
The defendant backed out of the garage and while reach-
ing for his sun glasses the car veered south to the point 
where the plaintiff and her niece were standing, knocking 
her to the ground. (R. 10, 30) 
The jury found the facts in favor of the plaintiff 
and returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant. The defendant appeals upon the 
grounds that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of 
law and that in any event the Court committed error in 
its instructions to the jury. Since no appeal is taken on 
the issue of the amount of damages awarded I shall not 
reply to defendant's suggestion that her injuries did 
not warrant the award granted by the jury. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I 
ON APPEAL FROM A FINDING AGAINST THE 
APPELLANT THE EVIDENCE· MUST BE CO,N-
STR.UED MOST FAVORABLY TO THE RESPOND-
ENT AND AGAINST THE APPELLANT. 
PoiNT II 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONTRIBUTO·RILY 
NEGLIGENT. 
a) The plaintiff violated no statute which 
w·ould bar recovery as a matter of law·. 
b) The question. of n.e gligence in this case was 
a, question /or the jury. 
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PoiNT III 
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED 
BY THE COURT IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
ON APPEAL FROM A FINDING AGAINST THE 
APPELLANT THE EVIDENCE MUST BE CO·N-
STRUED MOST FAVORABLY TO THE RESPOND-
ENT AND AGAINST THE APPELLANT. 
It is well settled law that on an appeal from an ad-
verse verdict the Court must presume that the jury con-
strued the testimony and resolved all conflicts in the 
evidence in favor of the respondent and in reviewing the 
jury's finding must construe the evidence most favorably 
to the respondent and against the appellant, and plaintiff-
respondent is entitled to every reasonable inference to 
be drawn from the evidence. Ware v. "}l elson, 88 N.W. 
524; Si1npson v. Hillnun1, 97 P. 2d 527: Tho1npson '· 
Fiorito, 9 P. 2d 989; Lord Y. Western [Tn·iou, 7 4 P. 2d 220. 
PoiNT II 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY 
NEGLIGENT. 
a) The plaintiff riolated no statute which 
u·ou1d bar reco'l'e'ry as a nlafter of laze. 
The statutes cited by the appellant haYe no applica-
tion to the facts of this ense. The appellant complains 
that the Court did not giYe consideration to his conten-
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tion that the spot upon which the respondent stood was 
part of the public roadway. The respondent offered no 
evidence to prove or tend to prove that the spot upon 
which respondent stood was part of a public highway or 
even that the adjacent drive strip was part of a public 
highway instead of a private driveway. The record is 
completely silent on this point. The inference in the 
absence of evidence must be to the contrary, for the jury 
so held and the Trial Judge fully considered this ques-
tion when defense counsel argued this point on his motion 
for a new trial and submitted his memorandum to the 
Court to support this contention. 
Section 41-6-8( d) U.C.A. 1953 cited by appellant to 
show the spot where plaintiff was standing as part of the 
public roadway defines what a Business District is and 
does not have anything to do with the question of public 
or private roadway. 41-6-S(c) U.C.A. 1953 applies to 
marked safety zones such as those set apart in a road-
way for passengers to wait for a streetcar or bus and also 
does not apply to these facts. 
The plaintiff in this action was standing still on a 
curbing adjacent to a drive apron and thus 41-6-79 U.C.A. 
1953 does not apply. This statute applies only to persons 
crossing a roadway. We cannot speculate on whether this 
statute might have applied to show negligence had the 
plaintiff actually proceeded into the public roadway -
those facts are simply not . before the Court on this 
appeal. 
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The plaintiff was not standing upon or walking 
along a public ro·adway and hence 41-6-82 U.C.A. 1953 
cited by appellant as aii act prohibited by law does not 
here apply. The statute prohibits ''walking along a;;uJ 
upon am adjacen-t roadway.'' There can can be no ques-
tion on this record that at the time the plaintiff was 
struck she was not even w·alking, and was not upon a 
roadwa.y. 
The a ppellarit in his efforts to pull the respondent 
into and upon a public roadway cites statutory definitions 
41-6-7 (a), (b), (c) and (d). (See appellant's brief, p. 6) 
He argues from a combination of these definitions that 
the entire area between the sidewalk and the paved street 
is therefore a part of the public roadway. It is obvious 
that the area adjoining the spot on which the respondent 
stood is a dirt and grass filled area between the sidewalk 
and the street curb. Certainly it would lead to a curious 
result to hold that a. person standing upon his lawn water-
ing it betw·een a sidewalk and a curb could be struck by 
a negligent driver driving out of the street and over 
the curb, and be barred from reroYery because he was 
by statutory definition upon a public road\vay. Such are-
sult 'Ya~ never intended by the legislature nor is the statute 
amenable to such a construction even by the most strained 
construction. 
f Il th:e ense before this (~ourt the plaintiff \\"aS stand-
ing ou the eurhing adjoining the drive,vay and the de-
fendnnt-appelhult. allowed his car to get out of control, 
~\verviug south into the plaintiff-respondent "Tho had 
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every right to stand where she was standing. The fact 
argued by appellant that she was considering crossing 
the street at a point other than the corner intersection 
does not bear upon the issues in this case. The fact is she 
had not crossed the street and was not struck in the 
course of crossin,g the street, hence her intention is not 
material. She might well have changed her mind before 
venturing into the street. 
It should be noted in concluding the consideration 
of this point that there is no evidence in the record to 
even show where the ''adjacent property lines'' as de-
fined by 41-6-7 (d) were located and the Court cannot pre-
sume without evidence that the spot where plaintiff-re-
spondent stood was not private property adjoining a 
private driveway. 
It should further be noted that 41-6-7 (c) defines a 
roadway as "That portion of highway improved, de-
signed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive 
of the berm or shoulder.'' (I tal. supplied) The testimony 
is clear and must be taken as true for purposes of this 
appeal that plaintiff was not on the portion of the alley 
''design-ed or ordinarily used for vehicula.r traffic,'' but 
on the contrary she was standing on the shoulder which 
was not ordinarily used for vehicular traffic: 
'' Q. Can you all see the picture. You came down 
this edge here ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now is there an area of concrete beyond the 
driveway portion? 
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A. Yes, there is. 
Q. And is that the area you were upon? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And where was your little niece standingT 
A. She was standing on the curb in the gutter. 
Q. In the gutter. Now could you determine 
after the accident whether the car had 
backed straight out the alleyway or had 
curved? 
A. It had curved. 
Q. And if it haq. proceeded on would it have 
stayed on the concrete? 
A. No. It would have been on the dirt.'' (R. 35, 
lines 2-16) 
'' Q. Counsel makes somewhat a play on words, 
Mrs. Ivie, about what is driveway and what 
isn't driveway. There is an area south of 
here and north of here that the vehicles do 
not drive upon, isn't that true T 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. And were you down beyond the area " .. here 
the vehicles ordinarily driYe T 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is all." 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
''By Mn. BERTOCH : 
Q. You say vehicles don't dri Ye on this area, Mrs. 
I vieT 
A. Not normally in that area. 
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Q. Well this vehicle drove on it! 
A. Yes. 
REDIRECT ExAMINATION 
''By MR. HYDE: 
Q. This vehicle wasn't driving normally was it, 
Mrs. Ivie~ 
A. No. 
''MR. BERTOCH : No further questions.'' ( R. 
35, lines 2-22) 
Since on appeal from the finding of the lower Court 
this testimony must be taken as true, she was not on a 
portion of a highway ordinarily used for vehicular travel 
and therefore even if there had been evidence in the rec-
ord that she was on the edge of a public drive, she was 
not on the portion ordinarily used by vehicles. Her testi-
mony as to this stands uncontradicted. The case of 
B,runette v. Biecke, 72 N.W.(2d) 702 involved a Wisconsin 
statute not at all like ours. It defined a highway as 
''every way or place of whatever nature open to the use 
of the public as a matter of right for the purpose of 
vehicular traffic." 88.44( 4) Wisconsin Statutes. (Emph-
asis supplied) Our statute limits the definition to the 
area of the highway ordinarily used for vehicular traffic. 
In this case the plaintiff was standing where only an 
automobile out of control could have struck her. A per-
son standing on a curb not ordinarily used for vehicular 
traffic need not anticipate that a car driven by a driver 
who loses control as a result of reaching for his sun 
glasses will back into her. 
·9 
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b) The question of negligence in this case was 
a question for the jury. 
Whether or not plaintiff kept a proper lookout is 
entirely an issue for the jury which the jury in this case 
resolved against the defendant. 
The plaintiff testified that she looked to see if any 
car was coming out of the garage and saw none. (R. 10) 
The fact that she looked away and failed to see the car 
backing out is not negligence as a matter of law. 
In the case of Millay v. Town Taxi Co., 136 N.E. 127, 
242 Mass. 314 the facts were similar to the facts in 
this case. There the plaintiff was standing not at the 
edge but in a public driveway talking to a friend at a 
point where the sidewalk crossed the driveway. The de-
fendant backed his cab out of the driveway and struck 
the plaintiff. The defendant contended just as in 
this case that the plaintiff failed to keep a proper look-
out and \\Tas therefore guilty of contributory negligence 
as a matter of la\Y. On appeal the Appellate Court said: 
''It could not ha Ye been ruled as a matter of 
la\\T that the plaintiff "~as rare less .... He also ha.d 
a right to assume that tra,~elers by automobile 
\vould not "Tithout giving some possible \Yarning, 
run him down .... The case u·as properly sub-
mitted to the jury and the except-ions 1nust be 
orerruled. '· (I tal. supplied) Jlillay v. To,zcn Cab 
(~o., 136 N.E. 127, ~42 I\Iass. 314. 
In Bou·1nan \". Hut(·hi-nson., 245 N.,\T. 596, 1~4 Neb. 188, 
the plaintiff was in an alley \Yashing "Tindows "Then 
10 
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struck. The Court held the plaintiff was not contribu-
torily negligent. 
The argument of counsel that a safer route was 
available to plaintiff does not make plaintiff negligent 
as a matter of law in this case. Had she been struck in 
the roadway perhaps this could be argued- a.t least to 
a jury. In this case she was standing on the edge of a 
concrete curb bordering the driveway. She doubtless 
would have been safer in bed but it would be incredible 
to contend that as a matter of law since there were 
safer places to be that plaintiff was negligent as a mat-
ter of law. 
In House v. Brandt, 185 Atl. 628, 323, Pac. 52, the 
plaintiff was walking past a truck in an alley. The truck 
started up and injured plaintiff. The defendant on ap-
peal argued that the plaintiff could have taken a safer 
route to his destination. The Appellate Court said: 
''A person who uses a street or highway that 
is thrown open for public travel, knowing that at 
the time there is a safer route which he may take 
to reach his destination ... is not necessarily 
guilty of negligence because he does not take the 
safer route." House v. Brandt, 185 Atl. 628, 323, 
Pa. 52. 
In a recent well-written case the Michigan court 
treated the problem of contributory negligence and set 
out the modern trend of decisions. In that case the plain-
tiff was crossing a public road 250 feet south of an inter-
section and was not within a crosswalk. He was struck 
11 
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after he had reached the middle of the road by the defend-
ant. The jury held for the plaintiff and the Trial Judge 
granted Judgment N.O.V. on the ground that the plain-
tiff was negligent as a matter of law. The Supreme Court 
reversed the Trial Judge and in doing so said : 
"It is not debatable that plaintiff's observations 
and/or his deductions therefrom were inadequate 
for his protection. If our test for contributory 
negligence was whether or not plaintiff had done 
all that he conceivably could have done, or even 
all that, in retrospect, it is obvious he should have 
done for his own safety, no negligence action could 
ever be maintained ... This court should not leave 
the pedestrian a legal sitting duck." (I tal. sup-
plied) Ware v. Nelson, 88 N.W. 2d 525. (Michigan 
1958) 
PoiNT III 
NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR WAS COMMITTED 
BY THE COURT IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY. 
The appellant excepts to the giving of Court's instruc-
tions Nos. 4 and 10 on the ground that these instructions 
set out conditions upon '\vhich the plaintiff may recover 
but do not set out that plaintiff is bound if she is guilty 
of contributory negligence. .\II of the Court's instruc-
tions must be rPad together as a "~hole to determine if 
the jury was adequately instructed. 
In instrurtion No. 2 the ('1ourt explained t'\Yire that 
~ven if the plnintiff ''"as other'\\'"ise entitled to recover, 
12 
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if contributory negligence was found, she would be 
barred from recovery by reason of such negligence. 
lnstruction No. 4 must be read together 'vith instrue-
tions 2 and 4(a) which elearly limited 4 to a recovery 
only on conditions that no contributory negligence was 
found. The Court, if anything, over-emphasized the issue 
of contributory negligence by repeating the charge that 
plaintiff would be defeated by any negligence on her part 
in instructions Nos. 2, 5 and 6. 
These instructions are in harmony with the instruc-
tions given for the instructing of juries by the Commit-
tee for Jury Instruction Forms for Utah. That Commit-
tee said at page XVI: 
"NO INSTRUCTION STATES ALL THE LAW 
In many instances instructions must be given 
in connection with others to give an accurate pic-
ture of the legal principles involved. .A. notable 
example of this is where there is a;n, issue of con-
tributory negligence. It seems needless repetition 
to include the proviso 'unless you find against the 
plaintiff on the issue of contributory negligence,' 
in the various instructions stating the basis upon 
which the plaintiff could recover. This should be 
kept in mind and instructions given together which 
are necessary to supplement each other." J.I.F.U. 
Page XVI. (Ital. supplied) 
The Trial Judge certainly followed this admonition 
to the letter and to avoid needless repetition instructed 
separately on the issue of contributory negligence. The 
jury was told in instruction No. 2 that if the jury found 
contributory negligence they must find for the defendant 
13 
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and against the plaintiff. Again immediately after 111-
struction 4 the Court again repeated and admonished the 
jury that if the plaintiff did not keep a proper lookout 
the jury must find against her. To make this proposition 
crystal clear the Court added instruction 5 telling the jury 
that if both were "to a degree negligent" the plaintiff 
could not recover. It is hard to imagine a more complete 
and full explanation of all the circumstances tha.t would 
defeat the plaintiff. 
The appellant has not seen fit to include in his desig-
nation of record the defendant's requested instructions 
and they are thus not before the Court on this appeal, 
and his contention that the Court committed error in not 
granting one of these cannot be considered on appeal. 
Dayton v. Free, 148 P. 408, 46 U. 277; Perry Ins. Co. v. 
Thomas, 278 P. 535, 74 U. 193. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no evidence to justify this Court in holding 
the plaintiff-respondent negligent as a matter of law. 
The injury to the plaintiff 'Yas not the proximate result 
of the Yiolation of any statute nor can it be held under 
the evidence that she was negligent as a matter of law. 
The (-.ourt 's instructions taken as a "Thole correctly 
ndYisPd the jury as to the la"T of the case. The verdict 
und judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GOR.DON I. HYDE 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
an:d Resp<indent · .. · · .. · · 
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